The Panzers of Prokhorovka: The Myth of Hitler’s Greatest Armoured Defeat

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Wheatley, Ben (2019). "A Visual Examination of the Battle of Prokhorovka". Journal of Intelligence History. 18 (2): 115–163. doi: 10.1080/16161262.2019.1606545. The USSR went on to inflict a major defeat on Germany during the Moscow counter-offensive during the winter of 1941–1942, closing the door on the Germans ending the war on the terms Hitler set out. The later Battle of Stalingrad in 1942–1943 ended the possibility of German victory completely. This particular engagement was a tactical defeat for the Soviets, but the charge inflicted enough damage to help stall — and eventually halt — the German army’s Citadel offensive.

Book sends tale of Soviet tank victory up in smoke

German success can be explained by two factors: an astonishing error made by Russian commanders, and the consequent opportunity for their German counterparts to display the superiority of their new tanks and their firepower. The Soviet tank charge By day's end on 11 July Leibstandarte had advanced deep into the Soviet third defensive belt. [63] They had moved up the Psel corridor, cleared Soviet resistance at the Oktyabrsky ("October") State Farm (Russian: Совхоз Октябрьский), crossed a 15-foot (4.6m)-deep anti-tank ditch at the base of Hill 252.2 and seized the hill itself after a brief but bloody battle, [64] leaving them only 3 kilometres (1.9mi) south of Prokhorovka. [63] To its northwest, the panzergrenadiers of Totenkopf had achieved a bridgehead across the Psel and tanks had been brought across, but they had yet to take Hill 226.6 and there was a 5-kilometre (3.1mi) gap between Totenkopf and Leibstandarte. To the south of Leibstandarte, Das Reich had also met stiff resistance and lagged behind some 4 kilometres (2.5mi). [62] With its advance, Leibstandarte‍ was exposed on both of its flanks. [64]Glantz also noted in When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler that the battle contributed in a small way to Germany’s later defeat on the Eastern Front by drawing away German troops intended for the advance on Moscow. Zamulin, Valeriy (2012). "Prokhorovka: The Origins and Evolution of a Myth". The Journal of Slavic Military Studies. 25 (4): 582–595. doi: 10.1080/13518046.2012.730391. S2CID 144132258. Today the Russian state declares that there are three sacred battlefields in its Motherland where 'victory' changed the course of the nation's history:

The Panzers of Prokhorovka by Ben Wheatley | Waterstones

Bellamy, Chris (2007). Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War. London: Pan. ISBN 978-0-330-48808-2. Karl-Heinz Frieser, Germany and the Second World War, Volume VIII, The Eastern Front 1943-1944 (2017).

Comparing Soviet and German archives, the total number of tanks and other heavy armoured fighting vehicles such as assault guns and self-propelled guns deployed by the 5th Guards Tank Army and the II SS-Panzer Corps around Prokhorovka during the battle numbered only about 910. [104] The II SS-Panzer Corps never had the number of tanks and assault guns attributed to it by Soviet estimates at any point during Operation Citadel, [129] not even at the start when it fielded only 494. [209] Even if the definition of the battle was broadened to include the III Panzer Corps and the portion of the 5th Guards Tank Army that faced it, the total number of tanks and other heavy armoured fighting vehicles comes out at a maximum of 1,299. [104] In contrast, for example, the Battle of Brody during Operation Barbarossa involved over 2,000 tanks, up to 6,000 tanks over the duration of the battle, engaged in combat over a 70-kilometre (43mi) front. [210] [211] Nonetheless, the Battle of Prokhorovka is still regarded as one of the largest tank battles in military history.

The Panzers of Prokhorovka - Bloomsbury Publishing The Panzers of Prokhorovka - Bloomsbury Publishing

Barbier, Mary Kathryn (2002). Kursk: The Greatest Tank Battle, 1943. St. Paul, MN: MBI Publishing Company. ISBN 978-0-7603-1254-4. Despite the huge number of tanks involved, Wheatley estimates the battlefront to have been no more than 3km (2 miles), so that, as he comments, ‘the location of one of the most famous battles of the Second World War was able to be photographed by the Luftwaffe in a single shot.’ The II SS-Panzer Corps reported 842 soldiers killed, wounded, or missing for 12 July, and 2,672 for 12 to 16 July inclusive. [188] Since the German forces controlled much of the Prokhorovka battlefield until 17 July, they were able to recover most of their disabled armoured vehicles. [185] [189] The II SS-Panzer Corps' logistics report for 12 July did not record any confirmed permanent tank losses. [189] Other German sources show that three tanks of the II SS-Panzer Corps (two Panzer IVs and a Tiger) that were immobilised in the battlefield could not be subsequently recovered and therefore the permanent losses can only be adjusted to a possible maximum of three tanks for 12 July. [189] A study by the US Army's Center for Strategy and Force Evaluation attributed six permanent tank losses, not counting Panzer I and Panzer II light tanks or German assault guns if any. [190] Archival files of the II SS-Panzer Corps and 4th Panzer Army show that the II SS-Panzer Corps permanently lost 17 tanks and assault guns from 12 to 23 July inclusive, which therefore represents the maximum permanent losses the unit could have incurred for the engagement on 12 July up till the end of Operation Roland. [187] The Battle of Prokhorovka has attained an almost holy status in Russian narratives of the war, celebrated not only as a victory but as a monumental and decisive engagement. In this book and the underlying research Ben Wheatley provides wholly persuasive empirical evidence that the familiar story of the battle is wrong. His findings speak for themselves and his clear, calm prose and evident respect for the Red Army serve only to make them more compelling. Expanding the battle beyond Prokhorovka, the total number of tanks fielded by the 2nd SS Panzer Corps and the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army at and near the battle amounted to 1,299, according to a statistical analysis published in 2000 by Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson.Nipe, George (2010). Blood, Steel, and Myth: The II.SS-Panzer-Korps and the Road to Prochorowka. Stamford, CT: RZM Publishing. ISBN 978-0-9748389-4-6. Zamulin, Valeriy (2006). Прохоровка — неизвестное сражение великой войны[ Prokhorovka – The Unknown Battle of the Great War] (in Russian). Moscow: Khranitel. ISBN 5-17-039548-5. – Comprehensive description of Soviet and German troop movements based on Soviet and German archives Wasting firemen. Hitler's influence on Post-Prokhorovka armoured strength prior to the defense of Kharkov This is a widely accepted view, of course, but to my mind The Panzers of Prokhorovka does not provide enough context to bridge the gap between the minuscule numbers of tanks lost at a tactical level in one battle and the vast array of destruction that epitomised the wider Eastern Front.